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FOREWORD
Present debates about national security issues often
revolve around the question of what type of “grand
strategy” the United States should have. Yet, “grand
strategy” itself can be a rather nebulous concept, and
discussions of the issue can thus confuse more than
they clarify. In this monograph, Hal Brands offers a
thorough analysis of what grand strategy actually is,
why it is so important, and why we often find it so challenging to design and implement. To do so, he draws
on some of the classic strategic texts, as well as the history of two key moments in modern American grand
strategy: the “golden age” of grand strategy during
the Truman years at the outset of the Cold War, and
the era of détente and triangular diplomacy with the
Soviet Union and China during the Nixon-Kissinger
years. Dr. Brands closes by offering a series of useful
ideas for how American officials might approach the
challenges of grand strategy in the 21st-century political and security environment.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this monograph as a useful contribution to the continuing debate over America’s role in a changing
world.
			
			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This monograph offers a critical examination of
the idea and utility of “grand strategy.” The concept is
very much in vogue these days, with commentators of
all stripes invoking it in one way or another. But what
the term actually means often remains unclear, and
discussions of the issue too often muddle or obscure
more than they illuminate. The purpose of this monograph, therefore, is to provide a more precise understanding of the meaning, importance, and challenges
of American grand strategy—not to recommend any
single grand strategy that the U.S. Government should
follow, but to illuminate the promise and limitations
of grand strategy as a national endeavor.
To this end, the monograph addresses three principal tasks. First, it offers a general discussion of what
grand strategy actually is, and why it is simultaneously so essential and so difficult to do. Second, it further fleshes out these issues by revisiting the doing of
grand strategy at key inflection points in the history of
U.S. foreign policy—during the Harry Truman years
of the early Cold War, and during the Richard Nixon/
Gerald Ford/Henry Kissinger years between 1969 and
1977. Third, this monograph offers several basic suggestions for how U.S. policymakers might approach
grand strategy as an intellectual and geopolitical
pursuit.
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THE PROMISE AND PITFALLS OF GRAND
STRATEGY
INTRODUCTION
“Grand strategy” is very much in vogue these
days. In the 2 decades since the end of the Cold War,
politicians and pundits alike have consistently proclaimed the need for a new American grand strategy,
and they have just as consistently flayed their opponents for failing to deliver one. Academics, journalists,
and public figures have authored books and articles
advocating particular grand strategies; major publications like Newsweek, Time, The New York Times, and The
Washington Post carry pieces discussing the concept in
one way or another. In 2008, the House Armed Services Committee even held hearings on the subject of
“A New Grand Strategy for the United States.” “The
United States,” one prominent author has proclaimed,
“is a superpower in search of a strategy.”1
But what exactly is “grand strategy?” Why is it
so important and, it would seem, so elusive? Grand
strategy, it turns out, is one of the most slippery and
widely abused terms in the foreign policy lexicon. The
concept is often invoked but less often defined, and
those who do define the phrase do so in a variety of
different, and often contradictory, ways. The result is
that discussions of grand strategy are often confused
or superficial. Too frequently, they muddle or obscure
more than they illuminate.
The purpose of this monograph is to provide a
more precise understanding of the meaning, importance, and challenges of American grand strategy. The
aim is not to recommend any particular grand strategy
that the U.S. Government should follow, but rather to
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illuminate the promise, perils, and limitations of grand
strategy as an endeavor. To this end, the remainder
of this monograph is divided into four sections. The
first section offers a discussion of what grand strategy
is, and why it is simultaneously so essential and so
difficult to do. The second and third sections further
flesh out these issues by revisiting the doing of grand
strategy at key inflection points in the history of U.S.
foreign policy: during the Harry Truman years in the
late-1940s and early-1950s, and during the Richard
Nixon/Gerald Ford/Henry Kissinger years between
1969 and 1977. The fourth section offers several basic suggestions for thinking about present-day grand
strategy as an intellectual and geopolitical pursuit.
UNDERSTANDING GRAND STRATEGY
“The primary purpose of any theory,” wrote Carl
von Clausewitz, “is to clarify concepts and ideas that
have become, as it were, confused and entangled. Not
until terms and concepts have been defined can one
hope to make any progress in examining the question clearly and simply and expect the reader to share
one’s views.”2 This maxim offers an appropriate point
of departure for an investigation of grand strategy.
Grand strategy is a notoriously ambiguous concept.
The term is often invoked but less often defined; those
who do define the phrase do so in a variety of different ways. It is thus useful to begin by explaining how
grand strategy is conceptualized in this monograph,
so as to clarify the analysis that follows.3
There is no single, universally accepted definition
of grand strategy. The British military historian Sir
Basil Liddell Hart popularized the term during the
mid-20th century, and most subsequent definitions of
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the concept have been based, in one way or another,
on his insight that grand strategy involves synchronizing means and ends at the highest level of national
policy.4 From here, however, concepts of grand strategy diverge considerably. Some analysts argue that
the term applies mainly to wartime decisionmaking
or military planning; others define it so broadly as to
make it virtually identical to the concept of foreign
policy as a whole. Some observers associate the idea
of grand strategy with systematic planning and the
promulgation of explicit “doctrines”; others contend
that most grand strategies are more implicit and assumed than formally enunciated. Definitions of grand
strategy are thus manifold, as are analyses that invoke
the term without defining it.5
The fact that there are so many competing conceptions of grand strategy should probably tell us that the
concept is subjective and ambiguous enough to defy
any singular definition. The best an analyst can do is
to strive for a definition that is, in the strategic theorist Colin Gray’s phrasing, “right enough.” That is, the
definition “does not have to meet any and every objection, but it must highlight the core of its subject, and it
must not mislead.”6
In this monograph, grand strategy is defined as
the theory, or logic, that binds a country’s highest interests to its daily interactions with the world. Policymakers who are doing grand strategy are not simply
reacting to events or handling them on a case-by-case
basis; they are operating in accordance with a more
structured and coherent idea of what their nation is
out to accomplish in international affairs. Dedicated
grand strategists should have a clear understanding
of their country’s most essential interests, the primary
threats to those interests, and the extent and limits of
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the resources available to ward off these threats and
advance core interests. From this intellectual calculus
flows policy, the various initiatives—diplomacy, the
use of force, and others—through which states interact with foreign governments and peoples. At its best,
then, grand strategy represents an integrated conception of interests, threats, resources, and policies. It is,
in this sense, the intellectual architecture that gives
structure to foreign policy and helps nations find their
way in the world.7
For the sake of clarity, several aspects of this definition bear further elaboration. The first is that grand
strategy is not any one aspect of foreign policy, nor is
it foreign policy as a whole. Foreign policy is the sum
total of a government’s interactions with the outside
world. It is expressed through initiatives ranging from
diplomacy to foreign aid to the use of military force.
Grand strategy, in contrast, is the conceptual logic that
ensures that such instruments are employed in ways
that maximize the benefits for a nation’s core interests.
Grand strategy inevitably shapes a nation’s foreign
policy—and thus its military policy, its diplomacy,
and other subsidiary components of foreign policy—
but the concepts are not one and the same.
Second, grand strategy provides the link between
short-term actions and medium- and long-term goals.
As noted above, grand strategy should flow not from
mere reactions to day-to-day events, but from a judgment of those enduring interests that transcend any
single crisis. As Dean Acheson once put it, the task
of the strategist is “to look ahead, not into the distant
future, but beyond the vision of the operating officers
caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far
enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to
come and outline what should be done to meet or an-
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ticipate them.”8 Yet Acheson’s comment also implies
that grand strategy is not just about setting mediumand long-term goals, but also about determining how
to achieve those goals via the day-to-day conduct
of foreign policy. In other words, grand strategy involves figuring out how to get from here to there; how
to make today’s policies bring about tomorrow’s desired end state.
Third, as Liddell Hart argued several decades
ago, grand strategy is preoccupied with the relationship between means and ends. Power is inherently
multidimensional. It stems not only from a nation’s
military might, but also from its economic strength,
internal cohesion, ideological appeal, and other factors. Accordingly, grand strategy involves combining
all aspects of national power to accomplish important
objectives. Yet, nations, even great powers, exist in a
world of limited resources, where capabilities are never sufficient to exploit all opportunities and confront
all threats. To avoid overreach, states must determine
which interests are truly vital and which threats and
opportunities most urgent, and deploy their resources
accordingly. Grand strategy is therefore a discipline of
trade-offs: it requires using the full extent of national
power when essential matters are at stake, but it also
involves conserving and protecting the sources of that
power.9
Fourth, grand strategy is as much a process as it is
any single principle. When Americans think of grand
strategy, they often think of terms like “containment,”
the organizing principle that guided American policy
for decades. But, as John Lewis Gaddis has pointed
out, containment was not a single grand strategy but
rather a string of several distinct grand strategies that
took varying approaches to taming Soviet power. As
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circumstances changed, American grand strategy also
evolved.10 Such is the case with grand strategy in general. Grand strategy occurs in a world where almost
nothing sits still, so while its overall goal may remain
constant, its various subcomponents—decisions on
how best to allocate resources, for instance—must inevitably shift as well.
These first four points lead to a fifth, which is that
grand strategy operates no less in peacetime than in
wartime. To be sure, the need for grand strategy is
most painfully evident in war, when threats are most
severe, interests most imperiled, and resources most
obviously stretched. Yet, the key premises of grand
strategy—that states must link long-term interests to
short- and medium-term policies, that they must prioritize among competing threats and often-contradictory goals—apply no less to the realm of peace than
the realm of war.
A sixth point concerns the issue of whether grand
strategy has to be formally enunciated and defined
to qualify as such. The answer, in a word, is “no.”
The term “grand strategy” is a relatively recent one,
and the notion that states should explicitly articulate their grand strategies—whether in public or in
private—arose more recently still.11 Moreover, while
some statesmen do deliberately set out to construct,
piece by piece, a logical chain running from interests
to threats to policies, foreign policy is often made in a
less systematic manner.
Yet, regardless of whether or not a country’s leaders seek to lay out a formal grand strategy, they inevitably engage in grand strategy nonetheless. All
countries must make trade-offs between competing
interests and priorities. All leaders—consciously
or unconsciously, on the basis of reasoned analysis,
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pure ideology, or something in between—make judgments about which goals are most important and
which threats are most deserving of attention. “All
states have a grand strategy,” notes Edward Luttwak,
“whether they know it or not.”12
All states thus do grand strategy, but many of them
do not do it particularly well. “Those who have developed successful grand strategies in the past have been
much the exception,” writes noted historian Williamson Murray. “Wars begun with little or no thought of
their consequences, assumptions unchallenged in the
face of harsh reality, the possibility of second- or thirdorder effects casually dismissed with the shrug of a
shoulder, and idle ignorance substituted for serious
consideration have bedeviled the actions of statesmen
and generals over the course of recorded history.”13
This brings us to two additional points about grand
strategy: that it is essential to effective statecraft, but it
is also immensely challenging to pull off.
Why Is Grand Strategy So Important?
A coherent grand strategy is fundamental to successful statecraft for several reasons. The first of these
has to do with the inevitable gap between resources
and interests. When it comes to foreign policy, there are
simply never enough resources to go around. Money,
troops, intelligence assets, time, and other resources
are always insufficient to neutralize every threat and
exploit every opportunity. Nor are great powers exempt from this dilemma. Expanding interests come
with new opportunities and new threats, and even
the most powerful countries the modern world has
ever seen—the British Empire at its peak; the United
States in the wake of World War II and after the Cold
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War—frequently struggled to meet the multitude of
demands imposed upon them. The prioritizing function of grand strategy is thus essential. If statesmen
are to avoid overreach and eventual national decline,
they must maintain a clear conception of their core interests and deploy their resources accordingly.14
Second, even if great powers can avoid this resource
dilemma, the diversity of their interests risks exposing
them to distraction and confusion. Great powers—superpowers especially—often have interests in nearly
every region of the world, and find themselves dealing with dozens of foreign policy issues from day to
day. Even if it were possible to address all of these
issues on a case-by-case basis, the various solutions
would inevitably come into conflict with one another.
For governments lacking a firm grasp of core interests and priorities, there is thus a danger that policy
will wander according to the crisis or fashion of the
moment. Statecraft will go in multiple, contradictory
directions; leaders will succumb to “theateritis”—the
tendency to neglect the broader geopolitical significance of a given problem.15 A coherent grand strategy,
by contrast, offers what one scholar calls a “conceptual center of gravity,” an ability to keep fundamental
interests squarely in view in dealing with a range of
complex and often contradictory demands.16
These first two points are closely related to a third,
which is, that grand strategy provides statesmen with
the “heuristic power” needed to address the insistent
demands of global diplomacy.17 The nature of foreign
policy is that it confronts statesmen with challenges for
which they have not adequately prepared, or which
they have not even considered. In many cases, these
challenges must be addressed in days or hours rather
than weeks or months—in other words, there is no op-
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portunity for prolonged reflection on all aspects of the
matter. No grand strategy can offer ready-made solutions to these crises, but performing the intellectual
tasks involved in doing grand strategy—defining and
prioritizing interests and threats, understanding the
extent and limits of a state’s capabilities—can provide
statesmen with the basic conceptual backdrop against
which to formulate a response.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, grand strategy is crucial because it is so difficult to compensate
for flaws and shortcomings therein. Effective statecraft is not just a product of competent grand strategy: it requires efficient execution by the soldiers and
diplomats who occupy the lower levels of foreign
policy as well. That said, states with a well-crafted
grand strategy may be able to overcome or correct
mistakes in the daily conduct of military or diplomatic policy, while those with a fundamentally deficient grand strategy will be hard pressed to preserve
their core interests over the medium and long term.
If statecraft flows from an incoherent grand strategy
based on misperceptions of fundamental interests or
flawed calculations of what a state’s resources will allow, or if diplomacy and military force are allowed
to proceed without guidance from these higher-level
assessments, even brilliant tactical performance may
ultimately be for naught.18
The most notorious example of this phenomenon
is Wilhelmine Germany. Before and during World
War I, Germany pursued a number of policies that
made sense in narrow tactical or operational terms,
but neglected larger grand strategic considerations
that eventually proved ruinous to the higher interests
of the state. The construction of a fleet of blue-water
battleships made Germany a leading sea power, but
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also ensured the enmity of the one nation—Great
Britain—whose naval expenditures Berlin could not
hope to match. The Schlieffen Plan was designed to
meet the challenge of a two-front conflict with France
and Russia, but by requiring German troops to violate
Belgian neutrality, it ensured that a wavering Great
Britain would enter the struggle as well. The decision
to resume unrestricted submarine warfare in early1917 was meant to resolve this dilemma by starving
Britain into submission, but it was also virtually certain to bring the United States into the conflict. In each
case, the imperatives of prudent grand strategy—the
need to minimize the number of one’s enemies, the
need to ensure that military strategy conformed to the
larger purposes of the state—ceded pride of place to
lower-level considerations. The consequences were
ultimately disastrous.19
Why Is Grand Strategy So Difficult?
In many ways, the challenge of grand strategy
flows directly from its meaning. As defined in this
monograph, grand strategy is an inherently difficult
endeavor that will tax the abilities of even the most
capacious leader. It requires a holistic view of interests, threats, and resources, as well as an understanding of the multidimensional yet finite nature of power.
Grand strategy demands the ability to make sense of a
multitude of complicated and confusing international
events, and an awareness of how a country’s responses to these events may complement or contradict one
another. Doing grand strategy also necessitates the vision to link today’s policies to a country’s highest and
most enduring interests, and the willingness to make
hard decisions about priorities and trade-offs. In sum,
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grand strategy is not simply a struggle against one
enemy or another; it is a fight against the complexity, disorder, and distraction that inevitably clutter the
global scene. It is bound to be an exacting task, one
full of potential pitfalls.
Indeed, if grand strategy is an important pursuit, it
can also be a deeply problematic one. Grand strategy
has been referred to as an ecological discipline, in that
it calls for a holistic perspective on world affairs. Yet,
it is also a reductionist discipline, because it impels
leaders to impose a sense of order and coherence on
a stubbornly complicated international environment.
This tendency is unavoidable, of course, but when
taken too far, it can also be pernicious. The world is
far too complex to be reduced to any single organizing framework. There is thus a fine line between clarity and dogmatism, between a useful heuristic and a
distorting myopia. As U.S. officials often found during the Cold War, in fact, too intense a focus on any
particular principle or strategy can lock a country into
inflexible interpretations of events that are inevitably
idiosyncratic. This tension between coherence and rigidity is a constant in the making of grand strategy,
even in the best of circumstances.20
Unfortunately, grand strategy is rarely made in the
best of circumstances. Rather, it must be forged by officials who operate under significant constraints and
pressure, and who are prone to the same cognitive fallibilities that plague all humans. Like all people, statesmen operate in a world of bounded rather than perfect
rationality.21 Their decisions are shaped by the limits
of their own intelligence as well as the potent mixture
of values, experience, and ideology that make up their
worldview.22 Moreover, they make these choices in a
world of imperfect information, and where conditions
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can change rapidly and unpredictably. “The greater
our involvement in the world, the more the railroad
train which always seems to be coming down the
track toward you is likely to hit you,” Henry Kissinger once remarked. “And while the chance that the
train will hit you is growing enormously, your ability
to deal thoughtfully with issues is of course declining.”23 Grand strategy cannot, in these circumstances,
be a product of pure rationality and total awareness; it
derives from a mishmash of cognitive influences and
an incomplete understanding of world affairs.
Simply devising a coherent grand strategy is thus
challenging enough for most policymakers. Unfortunately, conception represents only half the battle, for
there are numerous stumbling blocks to implementation as well. One such obstacle is the bureaucratic
system through which any grand strategy must be
executed. Bureaucracies are designed to provide expertise and routinization—both of which can be quite
helpful to foreign policy. Yet, in the American system
as in other systems, bureaucracies can also be ponderous, resistant to change, and hostile to policies—however wise or foolish those policies may be—that seem
detrimental to their own organizational interests. As
a result, what is desired by a policymaker and what
is actually implemented by the bureaucracy can be
two very different things.24 Conflict between different
bureaucracies within a single government can similarly hinder the formulation and execution of policy.
Finally, even if the bureaucracy seeks to implement a
leader’s policy faithfully, the process of transmission
between the high-level officials and planners who
craft a grand strategic concept and the diplomats, soldiers, and other lower-level individuals who carry it
out brings with it the risk of distortion. “Even if we
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had the most excellent conceptual foundation for an
American foreign policy and the greatest mastery of
diplomatic method in our external relations,” George
Kennan once remarked, “I feel we would still find
ourselves seriously hampered, as things stand today,
by the cumbersomeness of our governmental machinery.”25
Grand strategists also have to contend with the
characteristics of the American political system.
Contrary to what is sometimes thought, it is far too
simplistic to see democracy solely as an impediment
to purposeful statecraft. Walter Russell Mead, for instance, has compellingly argued that democracy is
good for the long-term health of grand strategy, because it provides mechanisms for aggregating interests and correcting flawed policies. Similarly, democracy and grand strategy must always go together in
the American system, for the simple reason that the
highest purpose of the latter should be the preservation of the former.26
But even so, the push and pull of democratic politics is very much a mixed blessing when it comes to
grand strategy. The diversity of interests within a
large nation like the United States can make it difficult
to identify a single “national interest.”27 Even if such
an interest is defined, the routine features of democratic rule—partisan wrangling, legislative-executive
discord, the state of public opinion—can throw the
entire process off kilter. Democratic governance may
reward statesmen for placing acceptability above effectiveness, and it may punish them for making more
enlightened choices.28 To the extent that a successful
grand strategy requires secrecy and surprise, it may
prove even more challenging to execute in a system
that prizes openness and transparency.
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Internal obstacles aside, grand strategy must be
implemented in the same tumultuous international
environment in which it is formulated. Rarely do
events conform to the expectations of even experts on
international affairs. More commonly, implementation of policy will be buffeted by a range of surprising
and unwelcome developments. A country’s actions
can be frustrated by those of its enemies; they can also
produce blowback in the form of unpredicted (and
perhaps unpredictable) third- or fourth-order reactions. Clausewitzian friction is a constant; what that
Prussian officer wrote about war is no less applicable
to grand strategy:
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest
thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end
by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable
unless one has experienced war. . . . Countless minor
incidents—the kind you can never really foresee—
combine to lower the general level of performance, so
that one always falls far short of the intended goal.29

At best, then, the doing of grand strategy is a
daunting task that requires flexibility, resilience, and
a capacity for adaptation. The end point of a grand
strategy may remain constant, but the route between
here and there will have to be adjusted as new threats
and opportunities arise. This being the case, grand
strategy places a premium not just on leadership and
a willingness to look ahead, but on the judgment and
wisdom needed to determine whether perseverance,
adaptation, or some mixture of the two constitutes the
proper route forward.
Yet, this is undeniably a tall order—so tall, in fact,
that any number of U.S. officials have questioned
whether consistent, purposeful grand strategy is even
14

possible. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance put the issue squarely in the late 1970s. “Policy is baloney,” he
said—better to simply deal with world events on a
case-by-case basis.30 Some 15 years later, President Bill
Clinton explicitly rejected the notion that grand strategy was a useful concept. “Strategic coherence,” he
told one adviser, “was largely imposed after the fact
by scholars, memoirists and ‘the chattering classes’.”31
These critiques of grand strategy may say as much
about the limitations of these particular officials as
about the limitations of the concept itself. Still, the
fact remains that the dilemmas of grand strategy have
long perplexed even the most geopolitically minded
and competent of American presidential administrations. Both the importance and the difficulty of this
process are evident from a brief examination of the
experiences of two such administrations: the Truman
administration in the late 1940s and early-1950s, and
the Nixon/Ford administrations 2 decades later.
TRUMAN AND THE “GOLDEN AGE”
The Truman years (1945-53) are often thought of
as the golden age of American grand strategy, a time
when a determined President and a group of talented
subordinates laid down enduring policies for containing Soviet power and stabilizing a shaken global
order. Dean Acheson famously (and immodestly)
titled his account of these years Present at the Creation,
while Clark Clifford, another of Truman’s advisers,
later opined that “we saved Europe, and we saved
the world.”32 Since the end of the Cold War, pundits
and policymakers alike have similarly described the
Truman era as a time of unmatched grand strategic
foresight and innovation, and invoked it as a refer-
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ence point in debates on present-day foreign policy.33
A brief review of this period can thus be useful in illuminating the full messiness of Truman-era grand
strategy, and in clarifying the insights for our own era.
The basic grand strategic problem of the Cold War
flowed directly from the outcome of World War II.
The defeat of Germany and Japan opened up massive
power vacuums in Europe and East Asia, while also
advancing Soviet influence deeper into these regions
than ever before. Hopes for continued superpower
cooperation soon faded amid a series of bilateral disputes, and by early-1946, U.S. officials were confronted with the prospect of a geopolitical struggle against
a ruthless totalitarian regime that seemed well-positioned to exploit the instability of the postwar world.
“We have here,” wrote George Kennan in his famous
Long Telegram, “a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the United States, there can
be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and
necessary that the internal harmony of our society be
disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the
international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet
power is to be secure.”34
Kennan’s Long Telegram, and his later “X Article”
in Foreign Affairs, laid out the intellectual rationale for
the containment policy that would guide the United
States for the next 4 decades. The Kremlin was determined to seek the “total destruction of rival power,”
he argued, but was in no hurry to do so. Badly weakened by World War II, and conscious of the superior
overall power of the United States, the Soviets would
retreat when met with determined resistance. War
could thus be avoided; it should be possible to check
Soviet advances through “a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unal-

16

terable counterforce at every point where they show
signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful
and stable world.” Over the long term, in fact, such
a policy would reveal the falsity of Marxist-Leninist
dogma, exacerbate the inner rottenness and decrepitude of Kremlin rule, and thereby bring about “either
the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.”35 Through calm and patient statecraft, the United
States might transcend the Soviet challenge altogether.
Kennan’s writings helped crystallize the incipient
Cold War consensus in Washington, and provided an
intellectual backdrop for a series of moves designed
to thwart the spread of Soviet influence—whether actual or merely feared—in 1946 and early 1947. Among
other things, the Truman administration confronted
the Kremlin over the presence of Soviet troops in
northern Iran, lent strong diplomatic support to Turkey in a dispute over Soviet access to the Dardanelles,
and took steps to prevent Moscow from participating in the occupation of Japan or gaining control of
the entire Korean peninsula. When the cash-strapped
United Kingdom (UK) terminated support to Greece
(whose government was under assault by communist
guerrillas) and Turkey in early-1947, the Truman administration pledged to fill the void, with the President declaring, in universalistic terms, that the United
States must henceforth “support free peoples who are
resisting subjugation by armed minorities or outside
pressures.”36
Containment had thus become the organizing
principle for U.S. foreign policy. Even into the first
months of 1947, however, this determination to hold
the line against Moscow had not yet been translated
into a coherent grand strategy for attaining that goal.
Neither the Long Telegram nor the X Article went be-
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yond vague generalities in describing what a policy
of containment should actually look like. Means and
ends were badly out of alignment, as fears of inflation
and pressures from a retrenchment-minded Congress
led Truman to slash military expenditures just as his
administration was piling up commitments along the
Eurasian periphery. “We were spread from hell to
breakfast,” Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett later
recalled, “all around the world.”37 Bureaucratic disarray and interservice rivalry compounded the problem, preventing the emergence of any unified scheme
of priorities in the struggle with Moscow. “There has
been a notable lack of any central planning on American policy,” noted Secretary of the Navy (later Secretary of Defense) James Forrestal in April 1947.38
A grand strategy did gradually begin to take shape
in 1947-48, primarily under the leadership of Secretary of State George Marshall, Forrestal, Kennan (now
head of policy planning at the State Department), and
a collection of other second-tier officials. The administration first responded to a dramatic deterioration
of social and economic conditions in Western Europe
by launching the Marshall Plan in June 1947. The European Recovery Program (ERP), as it was formally
known, aimed to use an infusion of U.S. aid to revive
self-confidence and economic growth in the region,
rehabilitate and reconstruct the western zones of Germany, and thereby avert the prospect of communist
gains in the region. In early-1948, Kennan’s Policy
Planning Staff (PPS) oversaw a similar shift in U.S.
policy toward Japan. U.S. authorities largely ended the
punitive aspects of the occupation, focusing instead
on restoring economic growth and political stability
under a conservative, anti-communist leadership. In
both cases, the overriding goal of U.S. policy was to
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restore a stable global balance by revitalizing forces
of resistance in the major industrial areas of Eurasia.
Kennan concisely summarized this grand strategy in
1948. “Any world balance of power means first and
foremost a balance on the Eurasian land mass,” he
said. “That balance is unthinkable as long as Germany
and Japan remain power vacuums.”39
As this comment indicates, the grand strategy that
developed during 1947-48 was rooted in a determined
effort to establish priorities and derive maximum utility from limited resources. As it focused on Western
Europe and Japan, the administration also sought to
scale down its commitment to exposed or untenable
positions, reducing support for Chiang Kai-Shek’s
corrupt regime in China in late-1947-48 and eventually withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea as well.
It was necessary, Marshall said in 1948, “to conserve
our very limited strength and apply it only where it
was likely to be most effective.”40 In the same vein,
the administration placed primary importance not on
rearming to compensate for the Kremlin’s conventional superiority in Europe and the Far East, but on
using political and economic measures to foster longterm stability in these areas. “The United States had
everything which the world needed to restore it to
normal and the Russians had nothing—neither capital
nor goods nor food,” said Forrestal. Provided that the
United States retained superior overall power, it could
therefore emphasize economic and political reconstruction in the key areas of Eurasia and tolerate otherwise-intimidating asymmetries in the conventional
military balance. “As long as we can out produce the
world, can control the sea and can strike inland with
the atomic bomb, we can assume certain risks otherwise unacceptable,” Forrestal commented. “The years
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before any possible power can achieve the capability
effectively to attack us with weapons of mass destruction are our years of opportunity.”41
Over the long term, the benefits of this approach
would be substantial. Historians generally agree that
the Marshall Plan played a key role in breaking bottlenecks, stabilizing trade, encouraging regional integration, and catalyzing the economic recovery that took
hold in the late 1940s and 1950s. The “reverse course”
in Japan had a similar effect, acting as the indispensable first step toward decades of growth and stability.42 Additionally, and in a broader sense, the decision
to avoid the high costs associated with a major rearmament campaign lessened the chances of a political
blowup at home that might have undercut Truman’s
internationalism before it even got off the ground. In
this respect, a key advantage of the administration’s
grand strategy was that it minimized the pain—economic and political—of American globalism in the
crucial early period of the Cold War.
It would take some time for these advantages to
become apparent, however, because in early-1948,
the geopolitical situation looked as threatening and
tenuous as ever. The Marshall Plan would eventually
put Western Europe on the road to recovery, but in
the short term, it actually touched off a new set of crises. Launching ERP had required Western European
governments to take risky steps, like evicting communists from their own governments and acquiescing in the economic revival of West Germany. Not
surprisingly, these measures raised tensions with the
Soviets, antagonized powerful communist parties in
Italy and France, and exacerbated feelings of insecurity throughout Western Europe. Anxieties ran high,
essential economic reforms stalled, and the future of
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the continent looked ominous indeed. European fears
only intensified in 1948, with the Soviet-backed coup
in Czechoslovakia and the onset of the Berlin blockade. The Europeans, Marshall told Forrestal and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), were “‘completely out of
their skin, and sitting on their nerves,’ and hope must
be recreated in them very soon.”43
The crisis in Europe showed that while the overall
goals of American grand strategy remained sound,
the tactics needed adjustment. The Truman administration had not initially planned to make a formal military commitment to Western Europe; the expectation
was that economic aid would be sufficient to restore
stability. Yet, it was now becoming clear that economic and political reconstruction could proceed only in
the climate of security that an American defense guarantee would provide. The crux of the matter, wrote
one official in 1948, was that “neither ERP nor military
support . . . can achieve success without the other.”44
As a result, the administration found itself assuming
a new set of obligations in Europe. It launched a major military assistance program for the region; more
significantly still, it agreed to full U.S. participation
in a transatlantic military alliance, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), and pledged to defend
Western Europe at the Rhine in case of war. The idea,
as Charles Bohlen put it, was to “instill that sense of
security in the people which they felt so essential if
recovery was to go forward.”45 If it took the nation’s
first peacetime military alliance to do this, so be it.
Meanwhile, American responsibilities in Asia were
also expanding during the late 1940s. With resources
stretched thin, U.S. officials had little desire to undertake major commitments on the Asian mainland, but
remaining aloof from the area quickly proved impossi-
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ble. Revitalizing the Japanese economy meant finding
markets for its exports and raw materials for its industries, and Southeast Asia in particular loomed large
as a source of both. Japan was “the natural workshop
for the Far East,” Kennan noted in 1949. “You have
the terrific problem of how then the Japanese are going to get along unless they again reopen some sort of
empire toward the south.”46 This imperative, in turn,
led the Truman administration to become increasingly
preoccupied with the prospect that the communist-led
Vietminh might come to power in French Indochina.
The result was as logical as it would ultimately be
tragic. By 1949, the United States was firmly committed to the survival of the French-backed monarchy in
Saigon; by the early-1950s, the United States would be
paying most of the costs of Paris’s war in Indochina.
Truman’s grand strategy emphasized defending the
core industrial areas of Eurasia, but it led to questionable commitments along the periphery as well.47
While the liabilities of U.S. involvement in Indochina would become apparent only with time, other
strategic dilemmas facing the administration were
far more immediate. As America’s responsibilities
had accumulated in 1948-49, its capabilities had not
kept pace. In Western Europe, the administration had
pledged to defend the Rhine in wartime, but because
Truman was determined to hold military expenditures
down, the United States possessed nothing like the
conventional military capabilities necessary to fulfill
this obligation. “The trouble,” Marshall pointed out as
early as February 1948, “was that we are playing with
fire while we have nothing with which to put it out.”48
American officials continued to believe that the atomic
monopoly provided an insurance policy of sorts, but
they were aware that this was an increasingly thin reed
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to lean on in the event that war broke out by miscalculation or design. As Truman acknowledged, “We have
the atomic bomb; but we must recognize the present
limitations of our strategic methods for delivering it,
and the vast problem of subduing a sprawling empire
stretching from Kamchatka to the Skaggerak [sic] with
this weapon.”49 Looking back on the period, Acheson
(Marshall’s successor at State) put it even more bluntly: “Mr. Truman’s period of retrenchment in 1948 and
1949 . . . put means out of relation with ends.”50
The political foundations of American grand strategy were also shakier than they appeared. Between
early-1947 and mid-1949, the Truman administration
had been blessed with a remarkable degree of bipartisan support for its major policy initiatives. That support owed partially to the administration’s assiduous
courtship of leading Republicans like Senator Arthur
Vandenberg, and also to its use of highly ideological
and even Manichean rhetoric to market the Truman
Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO at home. “The
only way we can sell the public on our new policy,”
wrote one official in early 1947, “is by emphasizing
the necessity of holding the line: communism vs. democracy should be the major theme.”51 Such rhetoric
served its immediate political purpose, but it also limited the administration’s subsequent ability to control
the domestic debate. As one scholar has recently noted, “Much of the rhetoric used in the service of ratifying the Marshall Plan—often hyperbolic, apocalyptic,
and brazenly anti-Communist—became woven into
the cultural milieu, largely to the dismay of American
policymakers.”52
It was in this uncertain climate that the United
States absorbed two geopolitical shocks in late 1949.
The triumph of communist forces in China in October
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had long been anticipated by the Truman administration; yet, it nonetheless had a jarring effect on policymakers and the American public. Having earlier touted the “communism vs. democracy” line, Truman and
his advisers now found it difficult to explain why the
“loss” of the world’s most populous country was not a
major setback in the struggle against Moscow. Sensing
weakness, Republican critics savaged Truman’s China
policy, severely limiting his flexibility in dealing with
the new regime in Beijing.53 No less problematic, the
conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and
alliance several months later led U.S. officials to fear
that China might became a launching pad for efforts
to destabilize the entire region. “From our viewpoint,”
Acheson commented, “the Soviet Union possesses
position of domination in China which it is using to
threaten Indochina, push in Malaya, stir up trouble in
the Philippines, and now to start trouble in Indonesia.”54
More unsettling still was news of the first Soviet
atomic test in August 1949. Most U.S. officials believed
that Moscow still desired to avoid war, but they worried that an emboldened Joseph Stalin might launch
limited probes around the periphery or seek to intimidate Western Europe and Japan into distancing themselves from the United States. “As the Soviet military
potential increases relative to that of the United States
and its allies,” one intelligence estimate predicted,
“the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] will
doubtless be willing to take greater risks than before
in pursuit of its aims.”55 The potential for “blackmail,”
the JCS told Truman, was “tremendous.”56 The United
States had lost a key strategic advantage, and the policy of limited rearmament now seemed unacceptably
dangerous.
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These developments thus set in train another key
shift in U.S. strategy. In early-1950, Truman approved
the development of thermonuclear weapons, and
called for a comprehensive review of national security
policy. The result, known as National Security Council (NSC)-68, endorsed the overall goals of American
policy, but it argued that the United States could secure a favorable balance of global power only through
the sort of comprehensive rearmament program that
Truman had so far avoided. “Without superior aggregate military strength,” wrote Paul Nitze, the primary
drafter of the document, “a policy of containment . . .
is no more than a policy of bluff.”57 The United States
needed the capabilities to make good on its proliferating global commitments, and to confront the Kremlin with superior strength at every turn. “The United
States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a struggle
for preponderant power,” he later wrote. “To seek
less than preponderant power would be to opt for defeat.”58 To achieve this level of power, Nitze estimated, defense expenditures would have to rise roughly
threefold from their current level of less than $15 billion annually.
Truman initially hesitated to endorse this amount
of defense spending, but his reluctance was overcome
by the onset of the Korean War in June 1950. U.S. officials had not considered the defense of South Korea
to be a vital interest in the period prior to the invasion;
American troops had been withdrawn in 1949, Pentagon war plans envisioned the abandonment of the
peninsula in the event of global conflict, and Acheson
had placed Korea outside the U.S. “defensive perimeter” in the Pacific in his speech to the National Press
Club in early 1950. Yet, given the streak of Soviet successes in the run-up to Korea, Truman and his advisers
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feared that a failure to act would have disastrous psychological consequences around the world. “We must
draw the line somewhere,” said JCS Chairman Omar
Bradley.59 Truman agreed, dispatching U.S. forces to
meet the invasion. Amid an unexpected crisis, the administration found itself recommitting to a position it
had earlier sought to discard.
The Korean War also cleared the way for the approval of NSC-68 and a variety of measures meant to
achieve the preponderant power that Nitze sought.
Defense spending soared from an expected $13.5 billion to over $48 billion during fiscal year 1951. NATO
become an integrated military structure, as Truman
named Dwight Eisenhower supreme commander of
the alliance and made preparations to send at least
four additional divisions, with accompanying tactical airpower, to Western Europe. The administration
also began to seek West German rearmament under
NATO auspices, took steps toward a peace treaty and
security alliance with Japan, increased its aid to the
French in Indochina, and used naval forces to neutralize the Taiwan Strait and ensure the survival of Nationalist forces on that island. The basic ethos of U.S.
policy was best captured by Acheson in late 1950:
It would not be too much if we had all the troops the
military want. If we had all of the things that our European allies want it would not be too much. If we
had a system for full mobilization it would not be too
much. Secretary Acheson said that how we get there
he doesn’t know, but he feels that the danger couldn’t
be greater than it is.60

As Melvyn Leffler observed, U.S. grand strategy
had come to emphasize waging limited war in Korea while seeking what Acheson called “situations of
strength” in Europe and other key theaters.61
26

In the overheated climate of mid- and late-1950,
however, the administration made a major geopolitical blunder. Truman, Acheson, and other top officials
understood that the United States should not risk a
wider war in Korea before the military buildup associated with NSC-68 had taken full effect. Yet following Douglas MacArthur’s dramatic success at Inchon,
Korea, in September, Truman nonetheless permitted his field commander to seek the destruction of
enemy forces and the reunification of the peninsula
rather than a return to the status quo ante. Anything
less than full victory, administration officials feared,
would represent “a policy of appeasement” at a time
when McCarthyism was in full flower, and would
constitute a forsaken chance to deal a sharp blow to
world communism. “If this is not done,” wrote one
State Department official, “the people of Korea will
lose all faith in the courage, intelligence, and morality
of the United States. And I, for one, would not blame
them.”62 The upshot was a massive Chinese intervention in November 1950, resulting in one of the worst
military setbacks in American history and leading to
fears that nuclear—even global—war might be in the
offing.
The Truman administration’s response to this setback demonstrated both the promise and perils of its
grand strategy. Truman, Acheson, and Bradley wisely rejected MacArthur’s call to expand the war into
China, instead focusing American energies on a slew
of initiatives to strengthen the broader U.S. geopolitical position. “We should not think in terms of Korea
alone,” Acheson insisted, “but in world-wide terms
and what we face around the world, principally in Europe.”63 The administration pushed ahead with plans
for German rearmament, expanded NATO to include
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Greece and Turkey, and signed defense pacts with
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.
The U.S. Army grew by nearly 1 million personnel
and 10 divisions; the Navy added some 450 ships and
over 400,000 sailors; the Air Force roughly doubled
in size; the Marine Corps grew from 74,000 to 246,000
personnel. The U.S. atomic arsenal increased from
299 weapons at the end of 1950 to 841 by 1952, giving
Washington a 17-to-1 advantage in nuclear arms.64 By
early 1953, Truman had assembled a position of great
geopolitical strength and effectively ensured that the
key geostrategic regions of Western Europe and East
Asia would remain tightly linked to the United States.
Yet, the price of all this was significant. Truman’s
policy of limited war left the United States mired in a
bloody conflict that placed great strain on American
resources. Korea, commented Marshall (now Secretary of Defense) in 1951, was “a great inconvenience
. . . a very heavy drain on us.” There were also questions as to how long the United States could afford the
massive military buildup prescribed by NSC-68. “Our
resources are not inexhaustible,” Truman lamented in
1952. “We can’t go on like this.”65 Nitze and Acheson
disagreed, but most scholars have since concluded
that the combination of high taxes, wage and price
controls, and budget deficits that NSC-68 entailed
would have been economically unsustainable over the
long run. In any case, they were politically unsustainable in the short and medium term. Eisenhower called
for a balanced budget and defense cuts upon taking
office in 1953, and Truman left the White House as
one of the least popular Presidents in modern history.
The “golden age,” in other words, did not appear so
golden at the time.66
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So what can all of this tell us about Truman-era
grand strategy, and about the broader challenges of
grand strategy as a national endeavor? First, it is clear
that there was real creativity, wisdom, and purpose in
American policy during the Truman years. Relatively
early on, the administration came to two fundamental
grand strategic insights that made up the intellectual
core of containment: the realization that there was a
middle ground between appeasement and war, and
the idea that checking Soviet advances meant, first and
foremost, establishing a favorable balance of power in
Europe and East Asia. The United States subsequently
constructed that balance through seminal initiatives
like the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the rehabilitation
of former enemies in West Germany and Japan. It then
defended that balance through the rearmament program and political-military initiatives undertaken in
response to the Korean War and NSC-68. In this sense,
grand strategy did its job: it provided the intellectual
ballast that allowed Truman to navigate the dangers
of the early-Cold War.
Yet, Truman-era grand strategy was also a messy
affair, and in some cases a deeply problematic one as
well. Containment did not spring forth fully formed
from the pen of George Kennan; it was an idea whose
practical implications had to be worked out amid the
myriad crises and shocks of the day. That workingout process, in turn, could be quite vexing for the Truman administration. The President and his advisers
continually struggled to reconcile America’s growing
military and political commitments with its limited capabilities, and to mobilize domestic support without
overheating the Cold War climate. They occasionally
found it difficult to maintain a sense of proportion in
meeting the challenge of the moment—as their short-
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sighted expansion of the Korean War illustrated—and,
no less so, to contain the Soviet Union without taking
on losing propositions like a colonial conflict in Indochina. The Truman era was indeed a period of grand
strategic innovation and purpose, but it was also one
of frequent frustration and difficulty.
This critique of Truman’s grand strategy should
not be taken too far, for the administration made real
strides toward accomplishing its most essential goal—
the creation of an advantageous configuration of
power in Eurasia.67 What these issues suggest, rather,
is that grand strategy was in the 1940s and 1950s what
it remains today—a disorderly, iterative process that
is never easy and demands frequent recalibration if it
is to work at all. It is a process that may originate in
a flash of geopolitical insight a la Kennan, but those
insights must then be translated into action amongst
the disruptions, fears, and crises that perpetually
characterize both domestic and foreign affairs. This
was something that Mr. X himself understood. “The
purposes of foreign policy will always be relative to
a moving stream of events,” he wrote in 1948. “Thus,
any formula for U.S. foreign policy objectives can
only be an indication of direction, not of final destination.”68 It was an apt description of Truman-era grand
strategy, and of the difficulties of grand strategy writ
large.
THE HEROIC STATESMAN: GRAND STRATEGY
IN THE KISSINGER YEARS
If the Truman administration is generally credited
with building the postwar order, the Nixon and Ford
administrations had the misfortune of governing as
that order was coming undone. Containment was in
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crisis in the late 1960s, with the Soviets approaching
nuclear parity and Communist China emerging as a
great power in its own right. Instability was rampant
in the Third World, and many of America’s alliances
were under strain. On top of all this, there was the
Vietnam War, which by 1969 had laid bare the limits of American power and caused a massive crisis of
authority at home. The “problem we face,” wrote National Security Adviser (and later Secretary of State)
Henry Kissinger, was “the generally deteriorating
strategic position of the United States during the past
decade.”69
It was, in many ways, a situation nicely tailored to
Kissinger’s own ambitions. From 1969 to 1977, Kissinger served as the driving intellectual force behind
American grand strategy.70 He was guided in this
task by geopolitical instincts honed from nearly 2 decades of studying the major problems of Cold War
foreign policy, and by an abiding faith in the power
of inspired statesmanship. Kissinger believed that
great leaders need not simply react to the crises they
confronted or watch as their nations sank into decline. Through bold and creative policies, they could
transcend these trials and seize hold of the course of
history.“Anyone wishing to affect events must be opportunist to some extent,” Kissinger observed in 1968.
“The real distinction is between those who adapt their
purposes to reality and those who seek to mold reality
in the light of their purposes.”71 This, in Kissinger’s
view, was the essence of grand strategy—not simply
matching means to ends, but waging the more profound struggle to “shape the currents of our time in
the light of our values.”72
Guided by this ethos, the Nixon and Ford administrations thus pursued something that was very much

31

a grand strategy. As Kissinger envisioned it, the United States would use innovative diplomacy to draw
its chief rivals into a more advantageous triangular
balance, devolve responsibility while maintaining
credibility, and ultimately position itself as the pivot
of a more stable global order. The challenge, he commented during the 1970s, was “to build a new building while tearing down the old beams and not letting
the structure collapse.”73 Through dynamic statecraft,
America would transcend its moment of relative decline.
The cornerstone of this grand strategy was to be
a revamped relationship with the great powers. With
respect to the Soviet Union, Kissinger and Nixon did
not so much abandon containment as modify it. They
believed that, in an age of growing Soviet power, the
key to dealing with Moscow was to provide it with
a mixture of positive and negative inducements for
behaving with restraint. This was the logic behind
the policies collectively known as “détente.” Strategic
arms talks would satisfy Soviet desires for nuclear parity while also imposing limits on the Kremlin buildup.
Negotiations over superpower flashpoints like Berlin
would reduce tensions and lower the potential for crises. Offering Moscow trade credits and most-favorednation (MFN) status would give Kremlin officials reason to behave well and pave the way for Moscow’s
eventual integration into the global economy. Tying
these policies together was the concept of “linkage,”
or the idea that the United States would demonstrate
progress on any one of these issues contingent on
across-the-board Soviet restraint. The Soviets “cannot
expect to reap the benefits of cooperation in one area
while seeking to take advantage of tension or confrontation elsewhere,” Kissinger explained.74 The relative
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power balance might be shifting, Kissinger believed,
but a precise structuring of Moscow’s incentives could
still allow the United States to exert great influence
over Soviet behavior.
The counterpart to U.S.-Soviet détente was a parallel opening to China. During the Sino-Soviet border
clashes of 1969, the administration made clear that it
would not condone a larger Soviet war against China,
and Nixon and Kissinger subsequently began diplomatic overtures to Beijing. These maneuvers were
based on a straightforward calculation that it would
be disastrous to allow Moscow to again dominate the
international communist movement, and also on the
more subtle and ambitious thesis that a triangular balance of power—featuring the United States, the Soviet
Union, and China—would be more stable and advantageous for the United States. As long as Washington maintained decent bilateral ties with China and
Moscow, both communist powers would have to contemplate an American partnership with a dangerous
rival, and both would therefore need to make their
own arrangements with the United States. “In a subtle
triangle of relations between Washington, Beijing,
and Moscow,” Kissinger had written in 1968, “we improve the possibilities of accommodations with each
as we increase our options toward both.”75 In an age of
limited resources, the United States would shape the
international environment through non-ideological
diplomacy rather than raw power.
Kissinger brought an equally creative approach to
the second aspect of his grand strategy—getting out of
Vietnam. Kissinger and Nixon understood that Vietnam was a strategic disaster, but they also believed
that a precipitous withdrawal would be devastating to
U.S. credibility. “In the conduct of long range Ameri-
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can policy throughout the world,” Kissinger commented, “it was important that we not be confounded
by a fifth rate agricultural power.”76 Between 1969
and 1972, the administration thus conducted a phased
withdrawal from South Vietnam, while using greatpower diplomacy and displays of American military
might to encourage Hanoi to agree to a compromise
settlement. In Beijing and Moscow, Kissinger told his
interlocutors that they must push Hanoi toward a
peace deal or endanger their incipient détentes with
the United States.77 At the same time, the administration employed sharp, unpredictable military action to
punish North Vietnam and signal to Beijing, Moscow,
and Hanoi that the war might spin out of control. The
bombing and eventual incursions into Cambodia and
Laos fit this mold; so did Nixon’s decision to bomb
Hanoi and mine Haiphong harbor in 1972. By synchronizing negotiations with tactical military escalation, Kissinger and Nixon hoped, the United States
might still find Hanoi’s “breaking point” and salvage
an acceptable outcome in Southeast Asia.78
The war in Vietnam was closely related to the third
component of Kissinger’s grand strategy, which consisted of efforts to decrease America’s burdens along
the global periphery without endangering the overall
stability of the international order. As in Vietnam, the
administration took a two-pronged approach to this
task. On the one side, Nixon and Kissinger (and later
Ford) used military sales, economic assistance, and
other indirect support to cultivate anti-communist
“regional sheriffs”—Israel, Iran, Indonesia, Brazil,
and others—who could assume greater responsibility for policing the Third World.79 On the other side,
they used sharp, sometimes dramatic action to demonstrate that the United States would not allow the
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international order to unravel completely. The United
States had to retrench, Kissinger believed, but it also
had to “prevent a complete collapse of the world’s
psychological balance of power.”80
This latter consideration underlay a series of provocative, even aggressive policies in the Third World.
Beginning in 1970, the administration sought to
overthrow Salvador Allende’s elected socialist government in Chile, on grounds that a failure to do so
would be seen “as indifference or impotence in the
face of clearly adverse developments in a region long
considered our sphere of influence.”81 More dramatic
still was U.S. policy during the Yom Kippur War in
October 1973. If Egypt and Syria—two Soviet clients—
were allowed to defeat America’s ally Isreal, Kissinger
commented, it “would have disastrous consequences
not only there but elsewhere, and would encourage
adventurism on a global scale.”82 The U.S. response
to the Arab surprise attack was striking in its scope
and risk. After first providing Israel with a massive
military resupply, and then encouraging it to press the
advantage against battered Arab armies (even to the
point of violating a United Nations-sponsored ceasefire), the administration ordered a global nuclear alert
to deter Moscow from interceding. At a time of global
transition and U.S. retrenchment, Kissinger believed
that a bold—even dangerous—approach to crisis
management was essential.83
Tying all of these policies together was a fourth
and final component of Kissinger-era statecraft—its
emphasis on extreme secrecy and centralization of
power. Kissinger and Nixon believed that their grand
strategy could not succeed unless they were able to
operate outside the normal constraints of the American system. “The bureaucracy is the curse of the mod-
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ern state,” Kissinger commented in 1970.84 “One cannot put a negotiation before 45 members of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee,” he said on another occasion.85 Accordingly, he and Nixon sought to keep
many of their most significant moves—the opening
to China, the destabilization of Chile, the bombing
of Laos and Cambodia—hidden from public view.
They disdained and even obstructed congressional
oversight of foreign policy, instructing subordinates
to stonewall on issues like human rights. Finally, they
conducted high-level talks with the Soviets, Chinese,
and North Vietnamese through backchannels kept secret even from the State Department, and attempted
to shut out many of the administration’s most senior
officials—Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Secretary of State William Rogers, Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Director Richard Helms, the JCS—from
the policy process. “Dr. Kissinger alone enjoys both
the intimate day-to-day contact and confidence of the
President,” one JCS staffer commented ruefully in
1970.86 In the Nixon administration, policy took on a
conspiratorial tone.
For a time, this grand strategy produced impressive results. Triangular diplomacy was particularly
well-suited to the climate of international politics in
the early 1970s. As Kissinger and Nixon had hoped,
Chinese insecurity vis-à-vis the Soviet Union facilitated Sino-American ties, leading to a rapprochement
that dramatically improved an overtaxed U.S. global
position. While Kissinger later exaggerated the degree
to which the “China card” had influenced U.S.-Soviet
relations, Moscow did hasten to achieve its own détente after it learned of the American opening to Beijing.87 The United States was “building a new strategic
alignment of forces in international politics in Asia and
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in the world as a whole,” Soviet ambassador Anatoly
Dobrynin noted in early 1972, and Moscow needed to
keep pace.88 By mid-1972, Nixon and Kissinger had finalized the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT)
and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) agreements with
the Soviet Union, concluded an accord that removed
Berlin as a superpower flashpoint, and inked another
that laid the basis for expanded East-West commerce.
With respect to great-power relations, Nixon and Kissenger's grand strategy looked to be well on track.
The regional-sheriff policy also paid some initial
dividends. This approach worked well in the Persian
Gulf, as the Shah’s Iran kept pressure on the Sovietbacked regime in Iraq and used U.S.-supplied military
equipment to stifle a leftist revolt in Oman. “The Shah
is a tough, mean guy,” Kissinger told Ford. “But he is
our real friend.”89 The situation was similar in Latin
America, where Brazil’s military government advanced U.S. interests by targeting leftist movements
at home and abroad. In 1971, the Brazilian military
conspired with Bolivian conservatives to overthrow
the left-leaning government in La Paz, and stationed
thousands of troops on the Uruguayan border in case
a popular front organization took power via elections
in that country.90 Following the U.S.-backed coup in
Chile in 1973, Augusto Pinochet quickly emerged
as another loyal ally in the region. As Kissinger had
hoped, friendly dictators combated regional instability and relieved the strain on American resources.
Kissinger scored an even-more-striking success
in 1973, during and after the Yom Kippur War. By
strongly supporting Israel while also keeping an open
line with Egypt, the Nixon administration put itself
in a strong position to shape the postwar settlement.
Although Nixon himself was increasingly consumed
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by Watergate, Kissinger subsequently used this opportunity to excellent effect. Shuttling between Jerusalem, Cairo, and Damascus, he gradually produced
agreements that achieved the disengagement of Israeli
and Arab forces, initiated the process by which Egypt
and Israel would eventually make peace, and—most
important of all—rendered Moscow largely irrelevant
to regional negotiations. The accords cemented Kissinger’s reputation as a master of international diplomacy, and served for him as confirmation that the
gifted statesman could indeed see beyond the curve
of history and impose his own purpose on events. “If
one studies our tactics carefully and thoughtfully,”
he told Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, “one must
come to the conclusion that our way of dealing with a
crisis is to try to judge the crest of the crisis and try to
anticipate the events that are happening and thereby
dominate them.”91
The methods of Kissinger’s grand strategy—particularly secrecy and the centralization of power—
played a key role in many of these accomplishments.
As Dobrynin later attested, the existence of a secure
backchannel was essential in developing détente and
bringing SALT to a conclusion. “Without that channel,” he later wrote, “it would hardly have been possible to reach many key agreements in a timely manner or to eliminate dangerous tensions that arose
periodically.”92 Similarly, even Kissinger’s critics
acknowledged that secrecy and personal diplomacy
were crucial to moving toward accommodation with
Beijing without exposing the process to interference
by actors—the Taiwan lobby, U.S. allies in Asia, Soviet
experts in the State Department—with an interest in
disrupting it.93 Finally, Kissinger’s ability to act with
“quasi-presidential” authority in 1973-74 allowed him
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to tie together the various implements of American
power in managing the Yom Kippur War and choreographing the delicate disengagement talks that followed.94
Yet, if these successes seemed to vindicate both the
methods and concepts of Kissinger’s grand strategy,
other events threw those methods and concepts into
doubt. For all their creativity, Nixon and Kissinger
could not retrieve victory from defeat in Vietnam; the
best they could do was to reach a deeply flawed peace
agreement that quickly collapsed, taking South Vietnam with it. Kissinger struggled to master unexpected
challenges that emerged during the 1970s, as issues
like human rights and petro-politics tested his worldview. Détente was also on the rocks by mid-decade,
with follow-on arms control negotiations stalled and
the Soviets supporting Marxist revolutionary movements in Third World locales such as Angola. By the
time Kissinger left office in early-1977, his grand strategy was clearly running out of gas.
These failures and disappointments reflected numerous factors, not all of which can be discussed in
detail here. There was, however, a common theme
that ran through many of Kissinger’s travails. As
noted above, Kissinger was taken with the “heroic”
style of leadership. He believed that great statesmen
could overcome the challenges their societies confronted through sheer creativity and brilliance, provided they were given the decisive authority necessary to turn wisdom into policy. As one biographer
put it, “Kissinger’s strategy depended on an almost
mythic grandmaster. . . . He allocated to the statesman
omniscient knowledge and initiative.”95 Kissinger
was talented enough to make this approach work for
a time, as his numerous accomplishments showed.
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As the 1970s went on, however, it became clear that
this performance could not be sustained. There were
simply limits to what even creative statecraft could accomplish in a complex and dynamic world, and the
methods of Kissinger’s grand strategy eventually ran
into resistance as well.
These problems confounded Kissinger in a variety
of settings during the 1970s. In Vietnam, triangular diplomacy and tactical escalation did eventually make
Hanoi more forthcoming in the secret peace negotiations, which eventually produced the Paris Accords
of early-1973. But these tactics could not compel Moscow and Beijing to cease their vital material support
for the North, which was essential if Kissinger’s plan
for success was to work. (As it happened, both the
Soviets and the Chinese, worried about losing influence vis-à-vis one another, actually increased their aid
to Hanoi during the crucial years in the early-1970s.96)
Nor could these tactics resolve the two essentially
insoluble problems the administration faced—the
underlying weakness of the Saigon regime and the
increasing war-weariness of the American people. Together, these factors ensured that Nixon and Kissinger
continued to fight a losing battle in Vietnam, and they
eventually acknowledged as much by settling for a
“decent interval” between a peace agreement and the
ultimate defeat of the regime in Saigon. “We want a
decent interval,” Kissinger wrote on a briefing book
for the 1971 trip to China. “You have our assurance.”97
Indeed, the Paris Accords were sharply tilted against
the long-term survival of the Saigon regime—among
other things, they allowed North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong troops to remain in place in the South—as the
subsequent course of the war soon showed.
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Détente ran into similar problems as the 1970s went
on. Détente was premised on the idea that the United
States could use a precise balance of carrots—particularly, trade incentives—and sticks to regulate Soviet
behavior. Yet, maintaining this balance required keeping firm control of the policy process, and by the mid1970s congressional opposition had made this impossible. Kissinger was partially to blame for this, as his
condescending attitude toward Congress did him no
favors, and his “consultation” with key congressional
figures was often late and superficial. No less problematic, the cleavages caused by Vietnam and Watergate shattered the domestic consensus behind détente
and spurred a full-fledged revolt against the very
executive authority that was so central to the administration’s grand strategy. The consequences of this
atmosphere became clear in 1974-75. A group of neoconservative senators led by Henry Jackson scuttled a
major U.S.-Soviet trade agreement that Kissinger had
viewed as a key pillar of détente, and then a bipartisan
majority in the House terminated funding for a covert
operation meant to thwart Soviet- and Cuban-backed
rebels from winning a civil war in Angola. “We are
being deprived of both the carrot and the stick,” Kissinger lamented.98
Détente also struggled because Kissinger overestimated the degree to which he could influence the
Soviet Union. Contrary to what he had hoped, the
Brezhnev government was not willing to accept the
key premise of linkage: that Moscow had to show restraint in all areas in order to gain American cooperation in any. At a time when Soviet power was on the
rise, Brezhnev and his aides perceived détente not as
a guarantee of the global status quo, but as a way of
achieving international legitimacy, limiting the dan-
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gers of war, and paving the way for advances in other
areas—particularly the Third World. The sense in
the Kremlin, one official later recalled, was that “the
world was turning in our direction.”99 The result was
that the mid-1970s saw Moscow become more, rather
than less, assertive in trying to shape the outcomes of
Third World revolutions, even as it negotiated with
the United States on arms control and other issues.
With the global balance shifting, it was beyond Kissinger’s power to set the terms of world order.
In many ways, in fact, the events of this period
showed how difficult it could be for even the most
astute statesman to stay ahead of the curve in international affairs. Kissinger considered the handling of
the Yom Kippur War to be one of his great triumphs,
but an unforeseen consequence of that episode was
the Arab oil embargo, which led to a fourfold rise in
prices and severe economic distress in the West. While
petro-states like Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Iran enjoyed unprecedented profits and a new sense of global
influence, the United States and its major allies experienced high inflation and depressed growth. The crisis
upended Kissinger’s assumptions about the sources
of global power, and left him scrambling to devise a
response. “I’m convinced that the biggest problem we
face now is possible economic collapse,” he said, “fall
of the western world.”100 In the end, the consequences
were not as dramatic as Kissinger feared, but they
nonetheless illustrated how unexpected challenges
can buffet even a carefully crafted grand strategy.
The same could be said of Kissinger’s dealings
with the growing human rights movement during
the mid-1970s. By 1974-75, U.S. ties to Pinochet, the
Brazilian generals, and other authoritarian rulers had
come under fire from human rights activists and liber-
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al congressmen and senators. Viewing human rights
as a distraction, Kissinger essentially sought to ignore
the problem, insisting that it was improper for the legislative branch to interfere with productive diplomatic
alliances. “My position . . . [is that] I don’t yield to
Congress on matters of principle,” he said.101 At a time
of growing congressional assertiveness, however, this
high-handed stance was counterproductive. Representative Donald Fraser and his allies passed legislation that linked foreign aid allotments to human rights
performance, compelled the State Department to issue reports on rights abuses in countries that received
American assistance, and reduced or terminated U.S.
aid to Santiago, Buenos Aires, and other capitals.102 By
late-1976, Kissinger’s Third World partnerships were
increasingly difficult to maintain.
As the course of détente and the rise of the human
rights issue demonstrated, the methods of Kissinger’s
grand strategy became steadily more problematic as
the Nixon-Ford years went on. As discussed previously, Kissinger reaped enough success to show that
his secretive modus operandi had its utility. In the
end, though, the conspiratorial style of grand strategy caused as many problems as it solved. It created
a thoroughly dysfunctional climate within government, as Kissinger and Nixon waged a permanent
campaign against the agencies that were meant to
serve the President. It led to a sort of low-intensity warfare between Kissinger and other Cabinet
heads—particularly Laird and his successors, James
Schlesinger and Donald Rumsfeld—who resorted to
leaks, intentional delays, and other methods of obstructing the decisionmaking process. It also deprived
top officials of expertise and information from the
bureaucracy. This liability repeatedly marred Kissing-
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er’s dealings with Southeast Asia between 1969 and
1971, when he and Nixon shut out State Department
and intelligence officials who might have warned that
attacking Laos and Cambodia would do little to improve the military situation but much to destabilize
these countries.103
Finally, the reliance on secrecy eventually became
self-defeating in a political sense. As noted previously,
Kissinger’s methods alienated congresspersons and
senators whose cooperation he needed. His style was
also badly out of sync with the national mood in the
mid-1970s. During a period when many Americans
were determined to rein in the executive secrecy and
power that had contributed to the disasters of Vietnam
and Watergate, Kissinger and the Presidents he served
seemed to be replicating—indeed, intensifying—these
practices. Sure enough, when certain of the administration’s secret pursuits—the bombing of Cambodia
and the destabilization of Chile and other countries—
came to light through news media reports and congressional inquiries, they fed a growing disillusionment with American policy. As Jimmy Carter charged
during the 1976 campaign, Kissinger was pursuing “a
kind of secretive, ‘Lone Ranger’ foreign policy, a oneman policy of international adventure.”104 By the time
Kissinger left office in early 1977, both his methods
and his policies had come under severe strain.
There are many insights to be drawn from Kissinger’s experience, but two principal ones stand out.
The first is that seeking to skirt the domestic and institutional constraints on grand strategy is inevitably
a double-edged sword. Concentrating power and
avoiding public oversight permitted great boldness
and dexterity during the Kissinger era, and these techniques were central to some of the Nixon administration’s greatest achievements. But the level of secrecy
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and concentrated power that Kissinger and Nixon
desired could not long be sustained, for it clashed too
sharply with the way that the American system was
meant to operate. The result was an eventual backlash
both within and outside of government, and a growing sense—nicely captured by Carter during the 1976
presidential campaign—that American policy had
come loose from its democratic moorings. When it
comes to grand strategy, working within the strictures
of the American system can be quite difficult. As Kissinger discovered, however, trying to circumvent or
ignore those strictures can also be deeply problematic.
The second and related insight is that there is inevitably a limit to what even a bold and audacious
grand strategy can accomplish. Kissinger’s experience
was, in some ways, a testament to the potential of
grand strategy, for it showed what purposeful statecraft could achieve, even at a time of relative national
decline. In the end, though, Kissinger’s concepts too
often ran up against domestic political constraints, the
actions of opponents and rivals, and the general stubbornness and unpredictability of a world in which
U.S. power was no longer unchallengeably ascendant. Grand strategy, then, was no panacea. In a difficult global environment, even innovative ideas and
extraordinary cleverness could take Kissinger only
so far.
IMPLICATIONS: GRAND STRATEGY
AS A NATIONAL ENDEAVOR
The Truman and Kissinger eras represent only a
small slice of the history of U.S. grand strategy, but
they nonetheless suffice to show both the importance
and the difficulty of that undertaking. As we look
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toward the future, there is little reason to think that
grand strategy will become either easier or less imperative. The United States now confronts an increasingly
fluid international environment in which there is no
overarching threat to focus its energies, but rather a
variety of lesser but still intimidating challenges—international terrorism, the rise of China, nuclear proliferation, instability in the greater Middle East, the
prospect of economic exhaustion, and others—that
compete for attention and resources. Those resources,
in turn, seem far scarcer than they did just a decade
ago. These factors will both demand and complicate
the doing of grand strategy; the fact that this task will
have to be performed in a highly polarized political
climate at home will only add to the challenge. The
United States will certainly need a coherent grand
strategy in the coming years, but whether it can produce and sustain one remains to be seen.
What follows are six very basic suggestions for
how American leaders might approach that task.
These suggestions are not intended to provide answers to specific policy problems, or to advocate any
particular grand strategy. They are meant simply as a
set of guidelines for thinking about present-day grand
strategy and the challenges it poses.
1. There Is No Good Alternative to Grand Strategy.
Given the growing complexity of the global order,
a number of prominent observers have suggested in
recent years that grand strategy is itself an anachronism. In an era in which there is no single, obvious
theme around which to organize American policy,
they contend, grand strategy has become a quixotic
and even pernicious pursuit.105 This argument has
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some merit. As discussed above, the difficulties and
drawbacks of grand strategy are undeniable. Moreover, the past few years have been replete with events
that have challenged longstanding assumptions, upended existing policies, and sent strategic planners
back to the drawing board—the Iraq war, the Arab
Spring, the continuing world economic crisis, and
others. “Given the divisions and uncertainties of the
contemporary environment,” notes Stephen Krasner,
“it is impossible to frame a responsible grand strategy.”106 Given that Krasner is a former director of the
State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, his skepticism is all the more striking.
Krasner may be right, but it is hard to imagine that
deliberately avoiding grand strategy offers a better alternative. “Strategic nihilism” will not, after all, allow
the United States to avoid the dilemmas that make
grand strategy so difficult; it will only exacerbate the
confusion and contradictions within American policy.107 And even if it is impossible to formulate and
fully implement a coherent grand strategy, doing the
leg-work associated with this task will still be rewarding. As Dwight Eisenhower liked to say, “The plans
are nothing, but the planning is everything.”108 Indeed,
the simple doing of grand strategy can itself serve a
variety of purposes. It can give policymakers a firmer
understanding of priorities and interests. It can force
them to think systematically about what American
resources will and will not permit. Most important,
doing grand strategy can provide an overall sense of
direction, a sort of intellectual anchor amid the geopolitical storms. None of this will obviate recalibration
and even improvisation. But it can increase the chances that these adjustments will be made intelligently, in
ways that are more congruent than not with longerterm national objectives. Policymakers would be wise
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to be skeptical about grand strategy, but they would
be foolish to dispense with it altogether.
2. Start with First Principles.
Grand strategy can only be valuable, however, only
if policymakers are willing to begin with the basics.
It is a truism that grand strategy is about setting priorities and differentiating between the essential and
the merely important. In practice, however, this often
proves surprisingly difficult to do. “Vital” interests
tend to expand along with a state’s power; expanding interests, in turn, bring new threats and temptations. It is easy, in these circumstances, for hierarchies
of interests and threats to become blurred or collapse
altogether. This was the problem that the Clinton
administration ran into in dealing with an uncertain
international environment during the 1990s. “We do
have a set of priorities that have been established by
Presidential Decision Directive that basically looks at
the world and says that there are 10 or 15 things that
matter most to American security,” Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence in 1997. Tenet (and presumably Clinton) neglected to consider that having 15
top priorities was probably equivalent to having zero
top priorities, and this confusion was often evident in
the Clinton-era foreign policy.109
The need for prioritization has become far more
pressing since Clinton’s time in the White House.
As Leslie Gelb has written, American leaders “must
either choose or lose.”110 The past decade has shown
that even hyperpowers have to deal with resource
constraints, and in light of current fiscal and political realities, it seems likely that spending on national
security programs will contract in the coming years.
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If American grand strategy is to be effective in these
conditions, U.S. officials will have to go back to first
principles. They will need to consider whether American security can be ensured only through a strategy of
global primacy, or whether a more parsimonious approach like “offshore balancing” can do the job. More
fundamentally still, officials will need to confront
hard questions about which interests are truly vital
and what threats demand most attention, and they
will need to use these priorities as a guide in deciding how—and whether—to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities. To do otherwise is to risk
geopolitical exhaustion and domestic disillusionment,
neither of which will be conducive to prudent policy
over the long run.
3. Think of Grand Strategy as a Process,
Not an Unalterable Blueprint.
None of this is to say that grand strategy should
be thought of as an immutable blueprint from which
policy must never deviate. In public parlance, grand
strategy is too often associated with the promulgation of official “doctrines,” pronouncements that lay
down—in advance—what the American response will
be to a specified set of circumstances.111 Doctrines certainly have their uses—they signal national resolve and
provide domestic and international observers with an
easily understandable expression of U.S. goals—but
grand strategy should be something different.
Because foreign policy deals with a dynamic world,
recalibration and adaptation are essential to any good
grand strategy. As we have seen, the “golden age” of
American grand strategy was characterized by repeated reassessments of what mix of means and commit-
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ments was required to contain Soviet power, even as
that overarching goal remained unchanged. Similarly,
Eisenhower—another President known for his grand
strategic competence—had his administration’s major
planning papers revised almost annually to ensure
that U.S. policies remained consistent with his overall goals and priorities. As Eisenhower understood,
grand strategy required a firm sense of purpose, but
significant tactical flexibility as well.
The same is true today. “Real strategy,” note two
observers, “is made in real time.”112 Grand strategy
should start with systematic planning, the setting of
goals and priorities, and the outlining of a realistic
course of action for realizing those objectives. The
time is ripe for a new Operation SOLARIUM-style
exercise, a broad-based examination meant to tackle
just these issues. But as was the case with the original
Operation SOLARIUM, the subsequent progression
of events will inevitably require that the initial roadmap be revised, assumptions reconsidered, and new
routes plotted for getting from here to there.113 Grand
strategy must therefore be seen as an iterative process,
one that involves processing feedback and correcting
course when necessary, all the while keeping core interests in view.
4. Bring Planners and Operators Together.
As much of the foregoing indicates, one of the central difficulties of grand strategy is linking the longterm goals set by planners to the short- and mediumterm actions that operators can reasonably take to deal
with the crisis of the moment. As Kennan and other
dedicated planners often discovered to their chagrin,
short- and long-term imperatives do not always align
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perfectly, and planners and operators have different institutional incentives to address this tension.114
There is no way to eliminate this problem, for it lies
at the very heart of grand strategy. Yet, it may, perhaps, be somewhat mitigated by bringing planners
and operators together at every stage of the process.
Bringing operators into the planning stages of grand
strategy can help sensitize planners to the nearer-term
requirements of good policy; bringing planners into
operations can help provide a longer-range perspective that is sometimes missing from the management
of day-to-day affairs. None of this will resolve the
underlying dilemma, but it might ease—if only by a
degree—the bureaucratic disconnects that often exacerbate the problem.115
5. Embrace the Democratic Messiness
of Grand Strategy.
The question of whether democracies can conduct
a policy that blends thoughtfulness, strategic consistency, and tactical flexibility has long perplexed
American officials. Kissinger, Nixon, and their intellectual brethren were certainly right in arguing that
the vicissitudes of democracy and bureaucracy can
have deleterious effects on foreign policy, and the
present political climate often seems downright hostile to reasoned strategic debate. But just as there is
no good alternative to grand strategy, so there is really no good substitute for embracing this messiness
and making the best of it. It has yet to be shown that
authoritarian regimes are consistently better at grand
strategy than are democracies, because personalized
rule and centralized power bring about their own pathologies.116 More to the point for American purposes,
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the experiences of those who sought to resolve this
problem by dramatically centralizing power in the
White House—read Kissinger and Nixon—have usually ended in grief.
This hardly means that there is no place for secrecy
or decisive executive action in foreign policy, for U.S.
laws and the American political tradition provide room
for both. Nor does it mean abandoning presidential
leadership and doing a least-common-denominator
foreign policy. What it means is that there is a crucial
political aspect to grand strategy, one that requires as
much attention as the diplomatic, military, and other
aspects. Making any grand strategy work requires
building consensus both within and outside an administration. Within the executive branch, Presidents
would be well advised to involve the key bureaucratic
players—military, intelligence, and diplomatic—early
enough in the planning process so that they do not
feel that they are simply being confronted with a fait
accompli. Outside the executive branch, there is no
substitute for persistent efforts to explain and sell an
administration’s grand strategy once it is formulated,
and for early, real, and regular consultation with the
congressional leaders whose cooperation will be necessary to turn ideas into action. All this, in turn, will
unavoidably entail bargaining, compromise, and the
frustration that comes with them. This is never going
to be a pretty or entirely satisfying process, but there
is no good way around it.
6. Keep Expectations Realistic.
All of these suggestions point to a final imperative:
the need to limit one’s expectations as to what grand
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strategy can accomplish. George Kennan, who is often
thought of as America’s archetypal grand strategist,
was fond of discussing the limitations of that concept—and of human foresight more broadly—in his
famous talks at the National War College in Washington, DC, during the late-1940s. As he put it in his valedictory lecture prior to leaving the Policy Planning
Staff at the end of 1949:
It is simply not given to human beings to know the
totality of truth. Similarly, no one can see in its totality
anything so fundamental and so unlimited in all its
implications as the development of our people in their
relation to their world environment. . . . I sometimes
like to think of the substance of human knowledge as
a sort of sphere, and at the center of that sphere there
must lie a core which is absolute truth. We keep charging into that sphere from various angles, knowing that
we are always going to be deflected at tangents, like
moths off the light bulb, before we get to the center.117

When it comes to thinking about grand strategy as
a national endeavor, the same basic point still holds.
Too often, grand strategy is thought of as a transformative project to remake the global order, or as a
panacea that will wipe away the complexity of world
affairs. Both of these aspirations are simply begging
for disappointment. In view of the experience of the
past decade and the current economic troubles, the
United States will probably not be able to undertake
any grand transformative schemes in the near future.
Nor can any amount of planning or strategizing allow American policy to transcend the complexities of
a changing international environment. At best, grand
strategy can provide an intellectual reference point
for dealing with those complexities, and a process
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by which dedicated policymakers can seek to bring
their resources and their day-to-day actions into better alignment with their country’s enduring interests.
Achieving this would be enough; expecting more
would be quixotic.
ENDNOTES
1. Quoted in Michael Lind, “A Concert-Balance Strategy for a
Multipolar World,” Parameters, Autumn 2008, pp. 48-60. On these
subjects, see Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, “A New Grand Strategy for the United States,” Testimony before the Committee on
Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
U.S. House of Representatives, July 31, 2008, available from www.
rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2008/RAND_CT313.
pdf; “A New U.S. Grand Strategy,” U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,” July 15, 2008, available from www.hsdl.
org/?view&did=34637; Niall Ferguson, “Wanted: A Grand Strategy
for America,” Newsweek, February 13, 2011, available from www.
newsweek.com; Daniel Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4, July/August 2011, pp. 57-68;
Parag Khanna, “America’s Non-Grand Strategy,” The Atlantic,
September 2011, available from www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2011/09/americas-non-grand-strategy/244367/.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter
Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1984, p. 132.
3. On the difficulty of defining strategy and grand strategy,
see Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On
Strategy,” in Alvin H. Bernstein, MacGregor Knox, and Williamson Murray, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 1-2; Timothy Andrews Sayle, “Defining and Teaching Grand Strategy,”
Foreign Policy Research Institute, The Telegram, Vol. 4, January
2011, available from www.fpri.org/telegram/201101.sayle.teaching
grandstrategy.pdf.

54

4. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, New York: Praeger, 1967
[1954], pp. 333-372. Hart, it should be noted, limited his definition
of grand strategy to the conduct of war.
5. For various definitions of grand strategy, see Williamson
Murray, “Thoughts on Grand Strategy,” in Murray, Richard Hart
Sinnreich, and James Lacey, eds. The Shaping of Grand Strategy:
Policy, Diplomacy, and War, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2011, p. 8; Sayle, “Defining and Teaching Grand Strategy”;
Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for America, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003; Paul Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and
Peace: Toward a Broader Definition,” in Kennedy, ed., Grand
Strategies in War and Peace, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1991, pp. 1-7; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold
War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005; Gaddis, “What
is Grand Strategy?” Karl von der Hayden Distinguished Lecture, Duke University, February 26, 2009; Colin Dueck, Reluctant
Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008, pp. 9-10; Edward
Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, Cambridge,
CT: Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 409; Walter McDougall,
“Can the United States Do Grand Strategy?” Orbis, Vol. 54, No. 1,
Spring 2010, pp. 165-184.
6. Colin Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory and Practice, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 17.
7. This definition is similar to that offered by Hal Brands, From
Berlin to Baghdad: America’s Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War
World, Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2008; Dueck,
Reluctant Crusaders, pp. 9-12.
8. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State
Department, New York: Norton, 1969, p. 214. See also Daniel W.
Drezner, ed., Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2009.
9. On these subjects, see Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The
Changing Nature of American Power, New York: Basic Books, 2001;
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York:
Vintage, 1989.

55

10. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment.
11. In the United States, the demand for a public articulation
of grand strategy became pronounced when the end of the Cold
War led to some confusion—both within and outside government—as to the central purpose of American policy. See Brands,
From Berlin to Baghdad, chaps. 2-3.
12. Luttwak, Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, p. 409.
13. Murray, “Thoughts on Grand Strategy,” pp. 3-4.
14. On these issues, see Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great
Powers.
15. Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad, esp. pp. 336-340. The term
“theateritis” is widely attributed to George Marshall. See Forrest
Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945, New
York: Viking Press, 1973, p. 335.
16. Gaddis, “What is Grand Strategy?”; “History, Grand
Strategy, and NATO Enlargement,” Survival, No. 40, Spring 1998,
pp. 145-151.
17. The phrase is from Stephen Krasner, “An Orienting Principle for Foreign Policy: The Deficiencies of ‘Grand Strategy’,”
Policy Review, No. 163, October 2010, available from www.hoover.
org/publications/policy-review/article/49786.
18. See Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, “Lessons of
War,” The National Interest, Winter 1988; also Millett and Murray,
eds., Military Effectiveness, 3 vols., London, UK: Allen & Unwin,
1988.
19. David D’Lugo and Ronald Rogowski, “The Anglo-German Naval Race and Comparative Constitutional ‘Fitness’,” in
Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of
Grand Strategy, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 6594; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1984, pp. 109-116.

56

20. The classic treatment of this subject is Leslie Gelb and
Richard Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1979.
21. See Herbert Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, Vol. 1,
Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press,
1984.
22. The literature on the role of ideology, emotion, irrationality, misperception, and other cognitive biases in decisionmaking
is immense. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976;
Michael Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1987; Frank Ninkovich, “Interests and Discourse in Diplomatic History,” Diplomatic History Vol. 13, No. 2,
Spring 1989, pp. 135-161.
23. Memorandum of Conversation with the Business Council,
December 1, 1971, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2003, I: Document # 101. Hereafter, documents from this series are cited as
FRUS followed by year, volume, and page or document number.
24. For a classic discussion of bureaucratic politics and American foreign policy, see Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter,
Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973, esp. pp. 1-42; also
Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971.
25. Kennan is quoted in Amy Zegart, “Why the Best is Not
Yet to Come in Policy Planning,” in Drezner, ed., Avoiding Trivia,
p. 119.
26. On these points, see Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World, New
York: Knopf, 2001; Michael Lind, The American Way of Strategy,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
27. See Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict
and Change in American Foreign Policy, Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1998.
57

28. To make this argument is not to relitigate the long-running debate about whether public opinion is well or poorly informed, or whether democracy is a net positive or negative for
the making of foreign policy. (In the aggregate, I tend to think
that democracies are probably superior to the competition when
it comes to making foreign policy.) Rather, it is simply to note that
democratic politics can encourage suboptimal grand-strategic decisions. For a careful consideration of these issues, see Miroslav
Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism,
New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
29. Clausewitz, On War, p. 119.
30. Quoted in Leslie H. Gelb, Power Rules: How Common Sense
Can Rescue American Foreign Policy, New York: HarperCollins,
2009, p. 103.
31. Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential
Diplomacy, New York: Random House, 2002, pp. 133-134.
32. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation; Oral History with
Clark Clifford, April 13, 1971, Oral History Collection, Harry S.
Truman Presidential Library (HSTL), p. 81.
33. In 2011, for example, two military analysts published an
article calling for a new “national strategic narrative” under the
pseudonym “Mr. Y,” an echo of George Kennan’s famous nom
de plume. See Mr. Y, “A National Strategic Narrative,” Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2011. See also, among many
others, Thomas Friedman, “Rethinking Foreign Affairs,” The New
York Times, February 7, 1992; R. W. Apple, “The Sense of Triumph
Fades, Uncertainty and Unease Grow,” The New York Times, December 29, 1991; Jim Lacey, “Finding X: The Quest to Outline the
U.S.’s Future Grand Strategy,” National Review Online, May 11,
2011.
34. “Long Telegram,” February 22, 1946, available from www.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm.
35. Ibid.; X (George Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 4, July 1947, esp. pp. 576-582.

58

36. “President Harry S. Truman’s Address Before a Joint
Session of Congress,” March 12, 1947, available from www.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm;
Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The
Truman Administration, and the Cold War, Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1992, pp. 100-140.
37. Quoted in Oral History Interview with Robert A. Lovett,
July 7, 1971, Oral History Collection, HSTL.
38. Forrestal Diary, April 26, 1947, Box 146, James Forrestal
Papers, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library (SMML), Princeton
University.
39. Kennan National War College Lecture, December 21, 1948,
Box 299, Kennan Papers, SMML. See also Melvyn Leffler, “The
Emergence of an American Grand Strategy,” in Leffler and Odd
Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I,
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 77-82.
40. Marshall is quoted in Henderson to Rankin, March 25,
1948, FRUS 1948, IV: pp. 64-65. See also Memorandum for the
President, November 26, 1948, Box 186, President’s Secretary File
(PSF), NSC Files, HSTL; Omar Bradley to Forrestal, March 22,
1949, Box 178, PSF, NSC, HSTL.
41. The quotes are from Forrestal Diary, 28 April 1947, Box
146, Forrestal Papers, SMML; William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War, Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 125.
42. See Wilson Miscamble, George F. Kennan and the Making
of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1992, pp. 73-74, 252-270.
43. “Meeting of the Secretary of Defense and the Service
Chiefs with the Secretary of State 1045 Hours,” October 10, 1948,
Box 147, Forrestal Papers, SMML. See also Memorandum of Conversation, April 3, 1949, Box 12, Records of Dean Acheson, Lot
53D444, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

59

44. “Memorandum,” November 11, 1948, Box 272, Averell
Harriman Papers, Library of Congress.
45. “Notes for Off-the-Record Remarks,” undated, Box 8,
Charles Bohlen Records, RG 59, NARA. See also Melvyn Leffler,
“The United States and the Strategic Dimensions of the Marshall
Plan,” Diplomatic History Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 1988, pp. 277-306.
46. “Record of Round-Table Discussion by Twenty-Five Far
East Experts with the Department of State on ‘American Policy
toward China,’” October 6-8, 1949, Box 151, PSF, HSTL.
47. On this point, see Michael Schaller, “Securing the Great
Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment
in Southeast Asia,” Journal of American History Vol. 69, No. 2,
September 1982, pp. 392-414.
48. Forrestal Diary, February 12, 1948, Box 147, Forrestal Papers, SMML.
49. Memorandum of Conversation, April 3, 1949, Box 12, Records of Dean Acheson, Lot 53D444, Record Group 59, NARA.
50. Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 735; also NSC 35, “Existing International Commitments Involving the Possible Use of
Armed Forces,” November 17, 1948, Box 177, NSC Files, HSTL.
51. John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United
States: An Interpretive History, New York: John Wiley, 1978, p. 195.
52. Marc Selverstone, Constructing the Monolith: The United
States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945-1950,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009, pp. 88-89.
53. The domestic fallout from Chiang’s collapse is discussed
in Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 295-296, 341-344.
54. USDEL to Webb, May 11, 1950, FRUS 1950, III: p. 1038.
55. ORE 32-50, “The Effect of the Soviet Possession of Atomic Bombs on the Security of the United States,” June 9, 1950,
National Security Archive (NSA), Washington, DC.
60

56. JCS to Johnson, 23 November 1949, FRUS 1949, I: 595-596;
also Memo by the Defense Members of the Working Group of the
Special Committee of the NSC, undated, FRUS 1949, I: 605-609.
57. NSC-68, “United States Objectives and Programs for
National Security,” April 12, 1950, PSF, HSTL.
58. “Paper Drafted by the Policy Planning Staff,” undated
(1952), FRUS 1952-54, II: pp. 64-65; Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,” International
Security, Vol. 4, No. 2, Autumn 1979, pp. 116-158.
59. Memorandum of Conversation, June 25, 1950, FRUS 1950,
VII: p. 158; also William Stueck, The Korean War: An International
History, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 41-45.
60. Memorandum for the President, December 15, 1950, Box
136, Paul Nitze Papers, Library of Congress. See also Gaddis,
Strategies of Containment, pp. 110-111.
61. Memorandum for the President, December 15, 1950, Box
136, Paul Nitze Papers, Library of Congress. See also Gaddis,
Strategies of Containment, pp. 110-111; Leffler, A Preponderance of
Power, chap. 10.
62. “Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast
Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff
(Nitze), July 24, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII: pp. 460-461. See also Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 19461948, New York: Knopf, 1972, pp. 355-356, 360; James Matray,
“Truman’s Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the
Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea,” Journal of American History, Vol.
66, No. 2, September 1979, pp. 314-333.
63. Memorandum for the President, November 28, 1950, Box
187, NSC Files, PSF, HSTL.
64. Allan Reed Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common
Defense: A Military History of the United States of America, New
York: Free Press, 1984, p. 491; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power,
chaps. 10-11.
61

65. The quotes are from MemCon between Truman and Pleven, January 29, 1951, Box 142, PSF, HSTL; Meeting between President Truman and President Auroil, March 29, 1952, Box 142, PSF,
HSTL.
66. See particularly Aaron Friedberg, In the Shadow of the
Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 70-71,
117-123.
67. The point is best made in Leffler, Preponderance of Power.
68. “Comments on the General Trend of U.S. Foreign Policy,”
August 20, 1948, Box 163, Kennan Papers, SMML.
69. Kissinger to Nixon, undated (late-1969), FRUS 1969-1976,
I: Document #39.
70. Nixon and Ford were, of course, ultimately responsible
for that grand strategy, and Nixon in particular played a key role
in shaping foreign policy until the Watergate scandal left him politically and emotionally crippled. As Jeremi Suri and John Lewis
Gaddis have made clear, however, Kissinger provided the overarching intellectual framework within which many of those policies were lodged. See Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, chaps. 9-10;
Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2007, chaps. 4-6.
71. Kissinger, “The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck,” Daedalus, Vol. 97, No. 3, Summer 1968, p. 910.
72. Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of
American Foreign Policy, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961, p. 8.
73. MemCon between Kissinger and TIME Editorial Board,
November 11, 1974, Box 26, Henry A. Kissinger (HAK) Records,
RG 59, NARA. See also Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century, chap. 5.
74. Nixon to Laird [letter drafted by Kissinger], February 4,
1969, Box 220, NSC Files, Nixon Presidential Materials (NPM). See
also Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, chap. 9.
62

75. Quoted in Evelyn Goh, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the ‘Soviet
Card’ in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971-1974,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 3, June 2005, p. 475.
76. MemCon between Kissinger and Schumann, August 4,
1969, NSA.
77. MemCon between Nixon, Kissinger, and Dobrynin,
October 20, 1969, Box 489, NSC, NPM; Jussi Hanhimaki, Flawed
Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 216-217.
78. The “breaking point” comment is from Walter Isaacson,
Kissinger: A Biography, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992, p. 246.
These initiatives are described in greater detail in Jeffrey Kimball,
Nixon’s Vietnam War, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas,
1998; Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam, New York: Touchstone, 2002.
79. Kissinger Background Briefing, February 16, 1970, FRUS
1969-1976, I: Document #58. See also Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third-World Interventions and the Making of Our Times,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 200-201, 211212.
80. Editorial Note on a Conversation between Kissinger and
Nixon, December 9, 1971, FRUS 1969-1976, XI: Document #256.
See also Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 300-301.
81. Kissinger to Nixon, November 5, 1970, Box H-29, Meetings
File, NSC, NPM. As historians have noted, there were various
motives behind the decision to seek Allende’s overthrow. Nonetheless, it is clear that the desire to avoid looking weak was what
crystallized this policy and lent it its urgency. See Hal Brands,
Latin America’s Cold War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2010, pp. 148-150.
82. MemCon between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai, November
11, 1973, NSA.

63

83. MemCon between Kissinger and Golda Meir, May 7, 1974,
Box 7, Henry A. Kissinger (HAK) Records, Executive Secretariat,
RG 59, NARA. See also Secretary’s Staff Meeting, October 24, 1973,
Box 1, Secretary’s Staff Meetings, HAK Records, RG 59, NARA.
84. MemCon between Kissinger and Stanford Faculty and
Students, May 6, 1970, FRUS 1969-1976, I: Document #65.
85. MemCon between Kissinger and Various Congressmen,
January 28, 1975, Box 22, HAK Records, Executive Secretariat, RG
59, NARA.
86. Asaf Siniver, Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S. Foreign Policy Making: The Machinery of Crisis, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2008, pp. 63-64. On the human rights issue, see Barbara
Keys, “Congress, Kissinger, and the Origins of Human Rights
Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 34, No. 5, November 2010,
pp. 823-851.
87. Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and Détente of the
1970s,” Cold War History, Vol. 8, No. 4, November 2008, pp. 435436; Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, p. 152.
88. Telegram from Ambassador Dobrynin to the Soviet Foreign Ministry,” March 8, 1972, FRUS: Soviet-American Relations,
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007, Document #267.
89. MemCon between Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft, August
17, 1974, Box 5, MemCons, National Security Adviser (NSA) File,
Gerald Ford Presidential Library (GFL). See also Douglas Little,
American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since
1945, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2008,
p. 145.
90. Brands, Latin America’s Cold War, p. 158.
91. MemCon between Kissinger and Meir, May 2, 1974, Box
7, HAK Records, RG 59, NARA. On the war and disengagement,
see Salim Yaqub, “The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and
the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in Frederik Logevall and Andew Preston, eds., Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 227-248.
64

92. See “Foreword by Anatoly Dobrynin,” FRUS: Soviet-American Relations, p. xxi; Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s
Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents, New York: Times
Books, 1995, pp. 199-200.
93. See, for instance, Yukinori Komine, Secrecy in U.S. Foreign
Policy: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Rapprochement with China, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008, chaps. 3-5. Marshall Green, one of the
few State Department officials to work closely with Kissinger
during his time as National Security Advisor, has since criticized
Kissinger’s reliance on secrecy but acknowledges that it paid dividends in this case. “Kissinger must have recognized . . . that any
real substantive progress in U.S.-PRC relations required careful,
probably secret, preparations, and that the U.S. emissary would
get nowhere unless he could meet directly with men like Mao
and Chou [Enlai].” Marshall Green to William Bundy, January 18,
1992, Box 17, Bundy Papers, SMML.
94. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999, p. 1060; Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century,
chap. 6.
95. Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century, p. 194.
96. Lorenz Luthi, “Beyond Betrayal: Beijing, Moscow, and the
Paris Negotiations, 1971-1973,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol.
11, No. 1, Winter 2009, pp. 60, 62, 73; Ilya Gaiduk, The Soviet Union
and the Vietnam War, Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 1996, pp. 239-241.
97. “Polo I Kissinger (Briefing Book) July 1971 Trip to China,”
NSC Files, Box 850, NPM; also Jussi Hanhimaki, “Selling the ‘Decent Interval:’ Kissinger, Triangular Diplomacy, and the End of
the Vietnam War, 1971-73,” Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 14, No. 1,
March 2003, pp. 159-194.
98. MemCon between Kissinger, Scowcroft, and Ford, December 18, 1975, Box 17, MemCons, NSA File, GFL. See also MemCon
between Kissinger, Scowcroft, and Ford, December 18, 1975, Box
17, MemCons, NSA File, GFL; Robert David Johnson, “The Unintended Consequences of Congressional Reform: The Clark and
Tunney Amendments and U.S. Policy toward Angola,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, No. 2, April 2003, pp. 215-243; Noam Kochavi,
65

“Insights Abandoned, Flexibility Lost: Kissinger, Soviet Jewish
Immigration, and the Demise of Détente,” Diplomatic History, Vol.
29, No. 3, June 2005, pp. 503-530.
99. Odd Arne Westad, “Moscow and the Angolan Crisis,
1974-1976: A New Pattern of Intervention,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8-9, Winter 1996/97, p. 21; also Westad,
Global Cold War, chaps. 6-8.
100. MemCon between Kissinger, Fraser, and Others, December 17, 1974, NSA. See also Andrew Scott Cooper, “Showdown
at Doha: The Secret Oil Deal that Helped Sink the Shah of Iran,”
Middle East Journal, Vol. 62, No. 4, Autumn 2008, esp. pp. 575-585.
101. Keys, “Congress, Kissinger, and the Origins of Human
Rights Diplomacy,” p. 838.
102. Ibid., esp. pp. 838-850.
103. William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign
Policy in the Nixon Presidency, New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1998, pp. 147-148; Siniver, Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S. Foreign
Policy Making, pp. 72, 106.
104. Hanhimaki, Flawed Architect, p. 450; John Robert Greene,
The Presidency of Gerald R. Ford, Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 1995, pp. 175-176.
105. Robert Jervis, “U.S. Grand Strategy: Mission Impossible,”
Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 3, Summer 1998, pp. 2236; Fareed Zakaria, “Stop Searching for an Obama Doctrine,” The
Washington Post, July 6, 2011; Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier,
“Good Riddance to the Bush Doctrine,” The Washington Post, July
13, 2008.
106. Krasner, “An Orienting Principle for Foreign Policy.”
107. The phrase comes from Richard Betts, “Is Strategy an
Illusion?” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, Fall 2000, p. 16.
108. Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, Waging Peace:
How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998, p. vii.
66

109. Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad, p. 202.
110. Gelb, Power Rules, p. 243.
111. As an example, see Zakaria, “Stop Searching for an
Obama Doctrine.”
112. See Sarah Kaplan and Eric Beinhocker, “The Real Value
of Strategic Planning,” Sloan Management Review, Vol. 44, No. 2,
Winter 2003, p. 72.
113. The evolution of Eisenhower’s strategic thought is nicely
covered in Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and
Thermonuclear War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998,
esp. pp. 41-89.
114. See George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, Boston, MA:
Little, Brown and Company, 1967, p. 464.
115. On this point, see Andrew P. N. Erdmann, “Foreign
Policy Planning Through a Private Sector Lens,” in Drezner, ed.,
Avoiding Trivia, esp. p. 151.
116. The point is well made in John Lewis Gaddis, We Now
Know: Rethinking Cold War History, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1997, pp. 289-291.
117. Kennan, “Where Do We Stand?” National War College
Lecture, December 21, 1949, Box 299, Kennan Papers, SMML.

67

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Anthony A. Cucolo III
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
Author
Dr. Hal Brands
Director of Publications
Dr. James G. Pierce
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

